NASA
DraftThe United States civil space agency, established in 1958 from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in response to Sputnik.
- Founded
- 1958, absorbing NACA and several existing research organisations
- Type
- Civil agency; military space is handled separately by the Space Force and NRO
- Scope
- Science, human exploration, aeronautics, technology development
- Structure
- Headquarters plus ten field centres and JPL, a federally funded research and development centre operated by Caltech
Field centres
The distributed centre structure is a persistent feature and a persistent constraint. Each centre has a distinct heritage and a congressional constituency, which shapes what work goes where.
| Centre | Focus |
|---|---|
| Jet Propulsion Laboratory | Robotic planetary exploration; operated under contract by Caltech |
| Goddard Space Flight Center | Earth and space science, astrophysics missions |
| Johnson Space Center | Human spaceflight, mission control, crew training |
| Kennedy Space Center | Launch operations and ground systems |
| Marshall Space Flight Center | Propulsion and launch vehicle development |
| Ames Research Center | Aeronautics, small spacecraft, computing, astrobiology |
| Langley Research Center | Aeronautics, atmospheric science, entry systems |
| Glenn Research Center | Propulsion, power, communications |
Programme structure
Work is organised into mission directorates, and the balance between them is the agency’s central internal tension.
| Directorate | Covers |
|---|---|
| Science | Planetary, astrophysics, heliophysics, Earth science |
| Exploration Systems Development | SLS, Orion, Gateway, human landing systems |
| Space Operations | ISS, commercial crew and cargo, space communications |
| Aeronautics | Aviation research |
| Space Technology | Cross-cutting technology maturation |
Exploration and operations together consume the larger share of the budget. Science produces most of the publicly recognised results from a smaller share, which is why cost growth in a flagship exploration programme is felt acutely across the science portfolio. The Mars Sample Return restructuring is the current example, described in Sample return missions.
Procurement
The shift from cost-plus to firm fixed-price contracting for defined services is the most consequential change in the agency’s recent history, and arguably has had more effect on the industry than any technology it developed.
COTS and CRS established the model for cargo delivery. Commercial Crew extended it to human transport, specifying the outcome rather than the design, holding a fixed price, and funding two providers. The programme delivered crew transport at a cost widely assessed as far below a traditional development, and produced two vehicles rather than one.
Cost-plus remains in use for SLS and Orion, which is the source of most audit criticism of those programmes. See Space agencies for the general argument about when each model is appropriate.
Selection processes
| Mechanism | Character |
|---|---|
| Decadal surveys | Community-generated science priorities, published by the National Academies every ten years |
| Competed mission classes | Discovery, New Frontiers and Explorer programmes, selected against cost caps |
| Directed missions | Flagship missions assigned rather than competed, usually following a decadal recommendation |
| Announcements of opportunity | Instrument and investigation selection within missions |
The decadal survey process is unusual and worth noting: priorities are set by the scientific community rather than by the agency, which insulates them from administration changes. Its weakness is that a decade is long enough for cost estimates to be overtaken.
Recurring criticisms
Stated plainly, since they appear in every audit and are largely accurate.
Cost and schedule growth on large directed programmes is persistent and documented. The centre structure distributes work for reasons that are partly political rather than technical. Programmes spanning multiple administrations face cancellation risk that no engineering margin covers, as Constellation demonstrated. And the agency’s dual role as both a developer and a customer of commercial services creates tensions it has not fully resolved.
None of these is unique to NASA, and the record on scientific return per dollar remains strong.
References
- NASA annual budget requests and the NASA Strategic Plan.
- NASA Office of Inspector General audit reports, particularly on SLS, Orion, HLS and Mars Sample Return.
- US Government Accountability Office, annual NASA Assessments of Major Projects.
- National Academies decadal surveys for planetary science, astrophysics, Earth science and heliophysics.